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Forthcoming in 44 Harvard Journal on Legislation ___ 
RETHINKING DISCLOSURE IN A WORLD OF RISK-BASED 
PRICING 
PATRICIA A. MCCOY∗ 
 In response to subprime loan abuses, it is 
 common for policymakers to exhort consumers to 
 comparison-shop for residential mortgages.  This 
 policy prescription ignores the fact that price 
 revelation works differently in the prime and 
 subprime markets, impeding search in subprime.  
 In the prime market, lenders reveal firm prices 
 for free, without requiring consumers to first 
 submit loan applications.  This dynamic, 
 combined with Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) 
 disclosures that standardize prices, make it 
 easy to comparison-shop for prime mortgages.  In 
 contrast, in the subprime market featuring risk-
 based pricing, consumers must reveal their 
 creditworthiness before lenders can determine 
 loan prices, which allows lenders to delay price 
 revelation until after taking loan applications.  
                     
∗
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 In numerous cases, subprime borrowers do not 
 learn firm prices until closing, due to a lack 
 of lock-in commitments and behind-the-scenes 
 negotiations over broker compensation.  As a 
 result, the subprime market is a pay-to-play 
 market where customers must often pay several 
 hundred dollars in application and appraisal 
 fees (and wait until closing) to discover actual 
 prices.  This process makes meaningful 
 comparison-shopping prohibitively expensive and 
 promotes oligopolistic pricing in the subprime 
 market.   
 
 The same price revelation dynamics cause Truth-
 in-Lending Act disclosures to break down for 
 subprime loans.  TILA allows subprime lenders to 
 advertise their best rates alone, misleading 
 customers with weaker credit.  In addition, TILA 
 does not require lenders to reveal binding 
 prices until closing (except for high-cost 
 refinance home mortgages).  Finally, TILA 
 disclosures for traditional adjustable-rate 
 mortgages, interest-only mortgages, and option 
 ARMs are hopelessly complex.  The article 
 concludes by proposing reforms to federal 
 disclosure laws to permit meaningful comparison-
 shopping and promote price competition in the 
 subprime mortgage market. 
 
 
In recent years, the mortgage debt of ordinary 
homeowners has mounted, garnering widespread 
attention and concern.  Policymakers exhort consumers 
to minimize their cost of credit by comparison-
shopping for home mortgages.  But calls for 
comparison-shopping ignore the fact that certain 
consumers--specifically, individuals with poor 
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credit--face informational barriers that make 
meaningful comparison-shopping for mortgages nearly 
impossible.  In view of these barriers, it is not at 
all surprising, as a leading scholar noted fifteen 
years ago, that shopping for credit “remains 
extremely limited--limited to the same upscale 
consumers who would manage perfectly well without 
benefit of legislation.”1 
 The system of mandatory mortgage disclosures in 
the United States was designed for the old world of 
prime loans.  The Truth in Lending Act and the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act were both enacted to 
remove informational barriers to consumer search for 
residential mortgages.2  These statutes were written 
when the sole conventional mortgage market was the 
prime market and access to home mortgages was limited 
to customers with strong credit.      
Since then, the U.S. residential mortgage market 
                     
1
 Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology:  Some 
Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 
233, 236 (1991). 
2
 See Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. 
I, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1601 – 1693 (2000)); Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 
(1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 – 
2617 (2000)); see also Rubin, supra note 1, at 233.   
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has undergone rapid change.  The market has evolved 
from strictly a prime market based on average-cost 
pricing (in which comparable mortgages have roughly 
one price) to a dual market offering both prime loans 
and subprime loans featuring risk-based pricing (in 
which the price for a given mortgage varies according 
to the borrower’s risk).3  
However well traditional mortgage disclosure 
rules work in prime market conditions, these rules 
break down in the subprime world of risk-based 
pricing.  Numerous subprime advertisements are 
tantamount to affirmative misrepresentations for most 
customers with blemished credit because lenders 
generally tout only their best rates.  Subprime 
lenders do not provide firm price quotes to customers 
before application and often not until closing, when 
it is too late to shop.  Similarly, lock-in 
commitments,4 which are customary in the prime market, 
                     
3
 Subprime loans are designed for borrowers with 
weaker credit and for borrowers who want low-
documentation or no-documentation loans.  See 
Elizabeth Renuart, An Overview of the Predatory 
Mortgage Lending Process, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 467, 
474 (2004), available at 
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/h
pd_1503_Renuart.pdf. 
4
 A lock-in commitment is “a lender’s promise to hold 
a certain interest rate and a certain number of 
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are rarely ever seen in the subprime world. 
If comparison-shopping means anything, it means 
the ability to obtain firm apples-to-apples price 
quotes from multiple lenders without having to pay 
large, nonrefundable fees.  Unfortunately, most 
subprime customers lack that ability.  Instead, under 
current federal disclosure laws, subprime lenders can 
entice customers with rosy prices that are not 
available to weaker borrowers, hike the price after 
customers pay a hefty application fee, then raise the 
price again at closing, often with no advance notice.  
Under these circumstances, our broken system of 
federal mortgage disclosures impedes meaningful 
comparison-shopping and efficient subprime prices.   
This state of affairs is not inevitable.  
Subprime lenders and mortgage brokers have the 
technology and information they need right now to 
provide firm price quotes to consumers at minimal 
cost without extracting large application fees.  
Requiring lenders and brokers to use this technology 
                                                       
points for [a loan applicant], usually for a 
specified period of time, while [the applicant’s] 
loan application is processed.”  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO MORTGAGE LOCK-INS 2, 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
lockins/default.htm. 
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to provide firm quotes would revolutionize consumer 
search in the subprime world.  Similarly, minor 
changes to federal regulations governing subprime 
mortgage advertising could help alleviate the current 
state of rampant misrepresentations and misleading 
omissions in the subprime market.  Advance disclosure 
of legitimate changes in loan terms at least a week 
before closing would further constrain bait-and-
switch tactics.  Finally, revamped disclosure rules 
for variable-rate5 loans would help consumers 
understand their worst case payment scenario, which 
is the biggest risk presented by these loans. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I 
describes how the residential mortgage market has 
evolved from a prime market based on average-cost 
pricing to a dual market that also uses risk-based 
pricing.  Part II provides a thumbnail description of 
the relevant provisions of federal mortgage 
disclosure law.  Part III explains why the market 
                     
5
 In a variable-rate loan “[t]he interest rate 
fluctuates over the life of the loan based on market 
conditions, but the loan agreement generally sets 
maximum and minimum rates.”  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., LOOKING FOR THE BEST MORTGAGE: SHOP, COMPARE, 
NEGOTIATE, available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
mortgage/mortb_1.htm.    
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dynamics of the subprime market cause the traditional 
disclosure rules to break down.  Part IV sets forth 
this Article’s proposals for reforming the disclosure 
rules to permit meaningful comparison-shopping in the 
subprime market.   
I. THE OLD WORLD AND THE NEW 
In the 1960s and 1970s, when current federal 
mortgage disclosure laws were enacted, the mortgage 
world was a different place.  Individuals with poor 
credit were systematically excluded from conventional 
credit, lenders gave free price quotes, lock-in 
commitments were common, and mortgages with 
comparable features went for approximately the same 
price.  Congress designed federal disclosure laws 
with these market conditions in mind.  In subsequent 
decades, when market conditions evolved and credit 
became available to weaker borrowers at higher, risk-
adjusted prices, the disclosure laws began to show 
their age.  
A. The Old World Of Average-Cost Pricing 
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 Before 1990, mortgage lenders generally 
restricted home loans to prime borrowers, who are 
individuals with strong credit.  Lenders rationed 
credit because demand exceeded supply.6  People who 
banks categorized as risky could not get conventional 
home mortgages.7  Furthermore, many lenders 
stereotyped blacks, Hispanics, and members of other 
minority groups as inherently risky and categorically 
denied them loans.8 
 In this market, known as the “prime market,” 
lenders price mortgages based on average cost.  Prime 
borrowers have narrow differences in credit risk.  
Lenders do not adjust the price for prime mortgages, 
however, based on these differences in risk.  
Instead, under average-cost pricing, a lender 
aggregates individual credit risks and computes one 
price for all of its prime borrowers based on the 
average.  As a result, for any given loan product, 
                     
6
 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit 
Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 
AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 - 95 (1981) (providing a 
theoretical justification for credit rationing at 
market equilibrium). 
7
 See id. 
8
 See, e.g., PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL 
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 
8.04[1], nn. 1 – 8 (2d ed. 2000 & Supps.). 
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such as a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage with no 
points, a lender will charge all of its prime 
borrowers an identical price.9  
Under average-cost pricing, not every loan 
applicant will qualify for and receive a loan.  
Instead, average-cost pricing amounts to a pass-fail 
system.  If the applicant qualifies, she receives the 
standard price.  If she does not, the lender denies 
the loan outright.10   
 Average-cost pricing has two important 
implications for efficient pricing.  First, prices 
for prime mortgages with comparable features are 
highly competitive and trade within a relatively 
narrow band.11  Similar mortgages have roughly 
homogeneous prices.  Second, this price competition 
gives prime borrowers leverage to demand concessions 
from lenders in the form of lock-in commitments, 
interest rate reductions in exchange for points, and 
the general absence of prepayment penalties.12 
                     
9
 See Arnold S. Kling, Get Set for Loan-Level Pricing, 
SMM MAG. (ANNUAL MORTGAGE MARKET TRENDS ISSUE), July 1997, at 
17, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/ 
smm/july97/pdfs/kling.pdf. 
10
 See id. at 17 - 18, 20. 
11
 See id. 
12
 See, e.g., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BORROWERS GAIN NO 
INTEREST RATE BENEFITS FROM PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ON SUBPRIME 
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B. The New World of “Risk-Based” Pricing 
 Starting in the late 1970s and continuing 
through the early 1990s, a confluence of legal, 
technological, and market forces caused the 
residential mortgage market in the United States to 
undergo wholesale transformation.13  These changes 
resulted in the emergence of the subprime mortgage 
market, which is designed for borrowers with poor 
credit and charges higher interest rates and fees 
than the prime market.  The subprime market charges 
different borrowers different prices for the same 
product, ostensibly based on their individual risk.   
 In theory, such “risk-based pricing” pigeonholes 
borrowers according to risk and calibrates prices 
accordingly.  This leads to multiple prices for the 
same loan.  The price of the loan goes up as the 
                                                       
MORTGAGES 2 – 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr005-
PPP_Interest_Rate-0105.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF 
REPEALING FANNIE MAE’S AND FREDDIE MAC’S SEC EXEMPTIONS 24 & 
nn. 48 – 49 (2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/41xx/doc4199/05-06-03-GSEs.pdf; David Reed, 
Understanding Mortgage Rates, Points, and Fees, REALTY 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, http://www.realtytimes.com/ 
rtcpages/20060331_understanding.htm.  
13
 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale 
of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory 
Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1273 - 80 (2002). 
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borrower’s creditworthiness goes down.14  A subprime 
lender, for example, may differentiate prices 
according to a complex matrix of factors, including 
credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt ratios, and 
prepayment risk.15    
 At this point, it is important to add a caveat:  
in reality, “risk-based pricing” is a misnomer.  
“Risk-based pricing” implies that pricing is 
accurately calibrated to credit risk.  In reality, 
prices in the subprime market are only partly based 
on differences in borrowers’ risk.  Other factors, 
including mortgage broker compensation, 
discrimination, and rent-seeking can and do push up 
subprime prices.16  This phenomenon has resulted in 
well-publicized abuses in the subprime market.17  
                     
14
 See Kling, supra note 9, at 17 - 18; Howard Lax et 
al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic 
Efficiency, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 533, 556 - 63 (2004), 
available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/ 
programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1503_Lax.pdf. 
15
 See Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: 
Present and Future Research, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 503, 
509 – 12 (2004). 
16
 See, e.g., Lax et al., supra note 14, at 565 
(finding that “some borrowers end up with subprime 
loans for reasons other than risk” and calling that 
finding “disturbing”). 
17
 See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1259 - 
70, 1280 - 98. 
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Accordingly, this Article uses the term “risk-based 
pricing” in its weak sense to refer to individualized 
pricing that may or may not be accurately tailored to 
a borrower’s risk. 
II. FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING PRICE REVELATION IN THE HOME MORTGAGE 
MARKETS 
 In thinking about whether comparison-shopping is 
feasible in the subprime market, it is necessary to 
analyze how prices are revealed to consumers.  In 
both the prime and subprime markets, price revelation 
is the result of interaction between market forces 
and federal (as well as state) disclosure laws.  Such 
interaction varies, often dramatically, depending on 
whether a consumer is shopping in the world of 
average-cost or risk-based pricing. 
 This Article focuses on federal disclosure laws 
governing closed-end residential mortgages (other 
than reverse mortgages),18 which are often associated 
                     
18
 Closed-end mortgages are loans that finance fixed 
amounts of principal.  Open-end mortgages, in 
contrast, are lines of credit in which the amount 
financed varies between zero and a dollar limit 
stated in the loan contract, at the borrower’s 
option.  See generally ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, 
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with subprime lending abuses.  Two major federal 
disclosure laws--the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)19 
and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(“RESPA”)20--mandate disclosures about the costs 
associated with most residential mortgages.  RESPA 
requires standardized disclosures about the 
settlement costs of residential mortgages.21  TILA 
requires lenders to disclose the cost of credit in 
two standardized formats: the finance charge and the 
annual percentage rate (“APR”).22  The finance charge 
seeks to capture the total dollar cost that a 
borrower will pay for credit, including interest 
                                                       
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 4.1.2 (5th ed. 
2003 & Supps.) (discussing open-end and closed-end 
credit); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., WHAT YOU 
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT HOME EQUITY LINES OF CREDIT, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/equity/equity-engligh.htm 
(comparing traditional mortgages with home equity 
lines of credit).  Reverse mortgages are 
“transactions in which payments are due only upon 
transfer of the dwelling in which the security 
interest is taken or when the consumer dies or 
moves.” RENUART & KEEST, supra, § 4.1.2. 
19
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 – 1693 (2000).  One section of 
TILA, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
(“HOEPA”), mandates stricter disclosures for the most 
expensive subprime loans.  For a description of 
HOEPA’s disclosure rules, see infra notes 66 - 72 and 
accompanying text. 
20
 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 – 2617 (2000). 
21
 See infra Part II.B.2. 
22
 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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payments, points, origination fees, and private 
mortgage insurance.  The APR provides a different 
metric of the total cost of credit by converting the 
finance charge into an effective interest rate per 
year.23  The Federal Reserve Board promulgates 
regulations implementing TILA, while the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) implements 
RESPA.24 
A. Regulation of Price Revelation in General 
Advertising 
 Often, consumers shop for products by comparing 
prices in general advertisements.  Neither TILA nor 
RESPA requires lenders to advertise prices.  
Consequently, when lenders advertise the cost of 
credit, they do so voluntarily.   
 TILA lightly regulates the content of loan 
                     
23
 See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, 
CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT, at I - II (1998) [hereinafter 
HUD-FED JOINT REPORT], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/t
ila.pdf. 
24
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a); 12 U.S.C. §§ 2602(6), 
2617(a). 
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advertisements, while RESPA does not regulate 
advertisements at all.  TILA’s provisions require 
lenders to make standardized disclosures whenever 
other price terms are advertised.  Specifically, any 
advertisement that states an interest rate must state 
the annual percentage rate.25  Written advertisements 
may also state a simple, periodic nominal interest 
rate to be applied to an unpaid balance so long as 
that rate is no more conspicuous than the APR.26  Oral 
responses to consumer inquiries about rates for 
closed-end loans, in contrast, may only state the 
APR.27  Finally, any advertisement that quotes any of 
four types of loan terms--a down payment by 
percentage or amount, the amount of any monthly loan 
payment or finance charge, the number of payments, or 
the period of repayment--must also state the APR, the 
terms of repayment, and the amount or percentage of 
any down payment.28   
                     
25
 15 U.S.C. § 1664(c); 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(b) (2005). 
26
 15 U.S.C. § 1664(c); 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(b). 
27
 15 U.S.C. § 1665(a); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.26(b) 
(creating an exception providing “that a simple 
annual rate or periodic rate also may be stated if it 
is applied to an unpaid balance”); cf. id. § 
226.26(a) (governing open-end credit). 
28
 15 U.S.C. § 1664(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(c); 
Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
Supp. I, § 226.24(c); cf. 12 C.F.R. § 226.16(d) 
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 Other provisions of TILA prohibit specific types 
of misrepresentations or misleading omissions in 
advertising.  Thus, lenders may not advertise 
specific credit terms, such as APRs or minimum down 
payments (such as “zero down payment” or “only 5% 
down”) unless they actually offer those terms.29  
However, neither TILA nor its regulations require 
subprime lenders to offer their best, advertised 
terms to every customer.  Indeed, the statute and the 
regulations do not even require lenders to provide 
disclaimers stating that availability depends on 
creditworthiness.30   
                                                       
(governing open-end home equity plans). 
29
 15 U.S.C. § 1662(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(a); cf. id. 
§ 226.16(a) (governing open-end credit). 
30
 Congress also recently amended TILA to provide that 
when a lender advertises a loan in which the amount 
lent may exceed the fair market value of a principal 
residence that secures the loan (either in paper 
format or on the Internet), the lender must clearly 
and conspicuously state that the interest on any 
principal that exceeds the home’s fair market value 
is not deductible for federal income tax purposes and 
advise consumers to consult a tax adviser.  See 15 
U.S.C.S. § 1664(e) (LexisNexis 2005); see also id. § 
1638(a)(15), (b)(3);  Truth in Lending, 70 Fed. Reg. 
60,235, 60,244 (Fed. Reserve Sys., advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking, Oct. 17, 2005).  This provision 
does not take effect, however, until twelve months 
after the date of publication of implementing 
regulations by the Federal Reserve Board.  Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
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 Advertisements featuring low introductory rates 
on variable-rate loans--known as “teaser rates”--
raise other difficulties that TILA fails to fully 
resolve.  Under TILA, an advertisement touting a 
teaser rate must state how long the teaser rate lasts 
and advise readers that the APR could rise after 
consummation.31  However, nothing in TILA requires an 
ad to describe the rate increase, its limits, or how 
it would affect the payment schedule.32  This allows 
lenders to entice borrowers with promises of low 
interest without revealing how high their interest 
rate could eventually go. 
 Other aspects of TILA regulation weaken the 
effect of even these few restrictions on home loan 
advertisements.  For instance, there are “no specific 
rules for the format of the necessary [advertising] 
disclosures.”33  While advertising under TILA is 
supposed to display information “clearly and 
                                                       
Pub. L. No. 109-8, tit. XIII, § 1302(c), 119 Stat. 
23, 209 (2005) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637a 
note).  As of November 19, 2006, no such regulations 
had yet been adopted. 
31
 15 U.S.C. § 1664(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(c); 
Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
Supp. I, §§ 226.17(c), 226.24(b) - (c). 
32
 Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
Supp. I, § 226.24(c). 
33
 Id. § 226.24. 
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conspicuously,”34 the spirit of that standard is often 
honored in the breach.  In fact, the Official Staff 
Interpretations of TILA’s regulations advise that the 
“credit terms need not be printed in a certain type 
size nor need they appear in any particular place in 
the advertisement.”35  What is more, consumers cannot 
sue lenders or the publications that run their ads 
under TILA for advertising violations.36  As a result, 
enforcement of TILA’s advertising rules is weak or 
nonexistent. 
 In sum, TILA’s provisions on mortgage 
advertising are silent on two key issues that affect 
truth in advertising for subprime loans.  First, TILA 
                     
34
 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a). 
35
 Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1); Official Staff 
Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 
226.17(a); cf. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(a)(1), 226.16(b) 
(governing open-end credit). 
36
 See, e.g., Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 442 
F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding that “it was the 
intent of Congress not to provide private civil 
relief for violations of the credit advertising 
provisions [of TILA]”), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 
(1971); Fidelity Mortgage Corp. v. Seattle Times Co., 
304 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1273 - 74 (W.D. Wash. 2004) 
(holding that a party who does not rely on misleading 
advertisements does not have standing to sue under 
the credit advertising provisions of TILA); see also 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), 1665 (describing the civil 
liability of creditors and the non-liability of 
advertising media). 
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allows subprime lenders to tout their best rates, 
without disclaimers and regardless of the fact that 
numerous subprime customers will not qualify for 
those rates.  Second, TILA permits lenders to dangle 
alluring teaser rates before consumers without 
notifying them how high their interest rates might go 
following rate reset.  Weak enforcement of TILA’s few 
advertising provisions further increases the 
likelihood of misleading disclosures. 
B. Subsequent Disclosures 
 When consumers shop for credit, they often 
inquire into the terms of specific loans.  For the 
most part, however, TILA and RESPA do not regulate 
disclosures in response to these consumer inquiries 
at or before the application stage.37  When a loan 
officer or broker takes an application, for instance, 
she will usually make representations to the customer 
about the nominal interest rate, the loan product 
(e.g., fixed, adjustable rate, hybrid, interest-
                     
37
 The main exception concerns disclosures about 
variable-rate features, which on rare occasions 
require earlier disclosures under TILA.  See infra 
notes 50 - 61 and accompanying text. 
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only), and the loan term (e.g., thirty years) by 
entering that information on the application form 
(Figure 1).  These entries are not binding, however, 
under TILA or RESPA.38  The lender is free, at least 
under these statutes, to change the loan product or 
the final terms of the loan for any reason after 
taking the loan application so long as the lender 
satisfies all subsequent disclosure requirements.  
Entries on the application form only become binding 
if the borrower and the lender privately negotiate a 
lock-in commitment, which is common in the prime 
market but not in the subprime market.39 
 After a consumer submits a loan application, 
TILA and RESPA impose disclosure requirements.40  As 
                     
38
 See infra notes 39 - 49, 62 - 65, 75 - 80 and 
accompanying text. 
39
 See Brooke A. Brower, On Focus: HUD Chief’s RESPA 
Fix Looks Less Sure as Critics Multiply, AM. BANKER, 
Mar. 3, 2003, at 1; Q4 2004 Impac Mortgage Holdings, 
Inc. Earning Conference Call-Final, FD (FAIR DISCLOSURE) 
WIRE, Feb. 15, 2005. 
40
 These requirements of TILA are subject to criminal 
and civil government enforcement.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1607, 1611.  Willful and knowing violations are 
punishable by a fine of up to $5000 and imprisonment 
for up to one year.  Id. § 1611.  In addition, 
borrowers can sue for actual damages, statutory 
damages, and attorneys’ fees--either individually or 
in class actions--for violations of TILA’s loan-
specific provisions.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). 
In certain closed-end, cash-out refinance home 
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discussed below, the content of those disclosures and 
their timing vary depending on the loan product and 
the statute. 
1. The Truth in Lending Act 
                                                       
mortgages, borrowers can rescind their loan 
transactions for any reason within three business 
days following consummation of the loan or the 
delivery of correct TILA disclosures, whichever is 
later.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).  At closing, lenders 
must provide such borrowers with written notice of 
the right to rescind under TILA.  Id.; 12 C.F.R. §§ 
226.5(a), 226.23(b).  In addition, borrowers with 
closed-end, cash-out, home refinance loans who 
receive inaccurate material disclosures (or who never 
receive disclosures) concerning the APR, any 
variable-rate features, the finance charge, the 
amount financed, total payments, or the payment 
schedule, can rescind their mortgages for up to three 
years following consummation.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(u), 
1635(e) - (f).  See generally RENUART & KEEST, supra 
note 18, § 6.4.2.5.  When a borrower qualifies for 
this extended right of rescission, the rescission 
period usually lasts until the sale of the property 
or three years after consummation of the loan, 
whichever is earlier.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).  
Furthermore, five states–-Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
Maine, Oklahoma, and Wyoming--have adopted TILA as a 
matter of state law and thus have an exemption from 
the federal act.  Therefore, if the laws of these 
states recognize the doctrine of recoupment, 
borrowers defending themselves against foreclosure or 
a collection suit can arguably rescind at any time, 
not just within three years.  See RENUART & KEEST, supra 
note 18, §§ 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 6.2.10. 
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a. In General.  Except for variable-rate disclosures, 
TILA does not require disclosures about loans that 
elicit consumer inquiries until sometime after 
application.  At that point, TILA requires written 
disclosure of the APR, the amount financed, the 
finance charge, and certain other features of the 
loan (Figure 2).41  The deadline for these disclosures 
depends on the loan type.  For first-lien, closed-end 
purchase money mortgages (i.e., loans used to buy 
homes) that are governed by RESPA,42 the lender 
                     
41
 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(A), (a)(3) - (a)(4); 12 
C.F.R. § 226.18(b) - (r); Official Staff 
Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 
226.18.  The required disclosures include, but are 
not limited to, descriptions of the payment schedule, 
any demand feature, the total sale price, the 
presence of a prepayment penalty, late fees, the 
security interest, and certain other fees.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1638(a)(5) - (a)(14), amended by Act of Apr. 20, 
2005, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638(a)(15) (LexisNexis 2005); 12 
C.F.R. § 226.18.  For loans not subject to RESPA, the 
lender must also provide a separate written 
itemization of the amount financed.  12 C.F.R. § 
226.18(c)(1); Official Staff Interpretations, 12 
C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.18(c). 
42
 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(19), 
(a)(24); Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.2(a)(24), amended by 63 Fed. 
Reg. 16,669 (Apr. 6, 1998).  RESPA applies to 
“federally related mortgage loans,” which include 
loans that have a federal nexus (defined broadly) and 
are secured by residential real estate designed 
principally for the occupancy of one to four 
families.  12 U.S.C. §§ 2602(1), 2603(a), 2604(a), 
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normally must deliver or mail good faith estimates of 
these TILA disclosures within three business days 
after receiving a written loan application.43  For 
most closed-end refinance mortgages, however, a 
lender can postpone making TILA disclosures until any 
time “before the credit is extended,”44 which the 
Federal Reserve Board construes to mean any time 
“before consummation.”45  Thus, for most refinance 
                                                       
2605(a), 2607, 2608(a), 2609(a) - (c), 2610 (2000); 
24 C.F.R. § 3500.5 (2005). 
43
 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(c)(2), 
226.19(a)(1); Official Staff Interpretations, 12 
C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.19(a)(1) - (a)(2).  
Alternatively, if the creditor determines within 
three days after receipt of a written application 
that the application will be turned down on the terms 
requested, no disclosures are necessary.  Official 
Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 
226.19(a)(1) - (4). 
In the rare event that the borrower consummates 
the loan before the three-day period elapses, the 
lender must make the disclosures before consummation.  
12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a)(1).  This could occur, for 
example, if a lender or broker fraudulently induced a 
consumer to sign a loan note unknowingly before the 
three-day period expired. 
44
 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(1).  High-cost, closed-end 
refinance home loans that are governed by the Home 
Ownership Equity and Protection Act (“HOEPA”) are 
subject to more stringent timing requirements.  See 
infra notes 66 - 72 and accompanying text. 
45
 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b).  The regulation defines 
“consummation” as “the time that a consumer becomes 
contractually obligated on a credit transaction” 
under state law.  12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13); Official 
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mortgages, a lender can delay providing TILA 
disclosures until the closing, so long as the 
customer signs the TILA disclosures before signing 
the loan agreement.  “Theoretically, at least, 
disclosures could be given one second or thirty days 
before consummation without violating this 
requirement.”46   
This loophole for refinance loans hobbles 
borrowers in the subprime market, where refinance 
loans have been rife with abuses.47  Even for loans 
requiring disclosures within three business days 
after receipt of application, most borrowers do not 
receive TILA disclosures before paying their 
application fees.48  These fees usually are 
nonrefundable and cost several hundred dollars.49  
Accordingly, unless a lender volunteers the 
information required by TILA before taking an 
                                                       
Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 
226.2(a)(13)-1. 
46
 RENUART & KEEST, supra note 18, § 4.3.2. 
47
 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1263, 1275, 
1279 n.104, 1282 n.118. 
48
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 39 - 42. 
49
 See, e.g., Stef Donev, Getting a Mortgage: Find the 
Best Loan (Sept. 13, 2006), 
http://mortgages.interest.com/content/articles/mortga
ge_story.asp?story_id=1000034867&ID=interest (“Most 
lenders charge a non-refundable application fee that 
can range from less than $250 to as much as $500.”). 
McCoy (JOL)  12/20/06 8:15 PM Page 25 
 
 
application, the customer must pay several hundred 
dollars in order to learn the price of the loan.  
Even then, under TILA, many refinance customers may 
not learn the price of the loan until closing. 
 The only time lenders must provide individual 
disclosures under TILA before customers pay 
application fees is for variable-rate disclosures.  
When a customer is considering a closed-end variable-
rate loan50 secured by her principal residence, the 
creditor must supply her with a generic government 
handbook that provides an overview of how adjustable-
rate mortgages work.51  The lender must also provide 
the customer with copious generic disclosures about 
every variable product in which the customer 
expresses an interest.  These disclosures, among 
                     
50
 This Article uses “variable-rate” and “adjustable-
rate” interchangeably. 
51
 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMER HANDBOOK 
ON ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES (ARM) (2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/arms/armstext_cove
r2005.pdf (quirkily known as the “charm book,” after 
its acronym).  In an adjustable-rate mortgage “the 
interest rate changes periodically, usually in 
relation to an index, and payments may go up or down 
accordingly.”  Id.  Alternatively, the lender may 
provide the borrower with a “suitable substitute” to 
the charm book.  12 C.F.R. § 226.19(b)(1); Official 
Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 
226.19(b)(1)-1. 
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other things, notify the customer that she has 
inquired about a variable-rate loan.52  A creditor who 
deals directly with the customer must furnish these 
disclosures whenever it provides the application form 
or before the customer pays a nonrefundable fee, 
whichever is earlier.53  When a creditor solicits a 
loan application by phone or through an intermediary 
agent or broker, however, it may deliver the 
disclosures or put them in the mail no later than 
three business days following receipt of the 
application.54 
 While the timing rules for variable-rate 
disclosures represent a modest improvement over the 
general disclosure rules, the content of those 
                     
52
 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(b) (containing disclosure rules 
for closed-end, variable-rate, home-secured loans 
with terms of over one year); Official Staff 
Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 
226.19(b)(2); cf. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(f). 
53
 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(b). 
54
 Id.  For discussion of when a mortgage broker 
qualifies as an “intermediary agent or broker” for 
purposes of this provision, see Official Staff 
Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 
226.19(b)-3.  If a mortgage broker does sufficient 
business with the creditor, the broker no longer 
qualifies as an “intermediary agent or broker,” thus 
requiring the creditor to treat all applications 
solicited by that broker as applications made 
directly to the creditor.  See id. 
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disclosures do not.  The disclosures, twelve in 
number, range from a generic explanation of the index 
and the margin to obscure disclosures about the 
potential payment shock once the interest rate 
resets.55  These profuse and bewildering disclosures 
amount to information overload (see example at 
Figures 3a – 3c).  Furthermore, some courts have 
construed TILA to deny statutory damages liability 
for failing to give the variable-rate disclosures.56   
 Perhaps as a consequence of this case law, which 
discourages compliance, one major consumer advocacy 
organization reported that “[f]ew of our clients ever 
get these initial disclosures.”57  Later, at the 
closing, the final relevant TILA disclosure simply 
states that “[y]our loan contains a variable-rate 
feature.  Disclosures about the variable-rate feature 
have been provided to you earlier” (Figure 2).  
Consequently, if the creditor fails to deliver the 
                     
55
 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(b). 
56
 See, e.g., Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, 349 F.3d 862 
(6th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc. 
202 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2000); see also RENUART & KEEST, 
supra note 18, § 8.6.5.3. 
57
 Letter from the Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. to Vice 
Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., and Governors Susan 
Schmidt Bies, Donald L. Kohn, and Mark W. Olson of 
the Fed. Reserve Bd. 2 (Jan. 17, 2006) (on file with 
the author). 
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initial variable-rate disclosures, the consumer will 
receive no advance disclosures about the maximum 
payment, the maximum interest rate, or the index 
used. 
 The variable-rate disclosure of greatest 
importance to most consumers is the worst case 
payment scenario under the loan--i.e., how high their 
monthly principal and interest payments could go if 
the loan hits its interest rate cap.  Presumably 
consumers would like to know the actual dollar amount 
of their highest possible monthly payment.  Instead, 
TILA allows lenders to provide a hypothetical 
involving payment shock on a $10,000 mortgage and let 
the borrowers do the math (Figure 3c, ¶ 4).58  
Alternatively, lenders may provide a historical 
example, again based on a $10,000 mortgage, 
explaining how high the payments would have gone 
                     
58
 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(b)(2)(viii)(B), (ix)(B) 
(stating that the lender may provide at its option 
the “maximum interest rate and payment for a $10,000 
loan originated at the initial interest rate (index 
value plus margin, adjusted by the amount of any 
discount or premium) in effect as of an identified 
month and year for the loan program disclosure 
assuming the maximum periodic increases in rates and 
payments under the program,” along with an 
“explanation of how the consumer may calculate the 
payments for the loan amount to be borrowed based on” 
the $10,000 hypothetical). 
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under the terms of that loan based on the historical 
high for the past fifteen years (Figure 4).59  Lenders 
cling to the $10,000 hypotheticals, which are arcane 
in the extreme, precisely because many consumers, 
particularly vulnerable ones, cannot calculate the 
payment shock for variable-rate mortgages.60  The 
$10,000 hypotheticals are so badly outdated that the 
New York Times recently advised borrowers with exotic 
adjustable-rate mortgages to figure out their maximum 
                     
59
 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(b)(2)(viii)(A) (providing 
that the lender may alternatively disclose a 
“historical example, based on a $10,000 loan amount, 
illustrating how payments and the loan balance would 
have been affected by interest rate changes 
implemented according to the terms of the loan 
program disclosure”).  Lenders must also explain how 
consumers can apply the historical example to 
calculate the maximum payment on their own loans.  12 
C.F.R. § 226.19(b)(2)(ix)(A). 
60
 A 2004 study by the Consumer Federation of America 
found that over one-third of all Americans surveyed 
who preferred ARMs could not estimate a hypothetical 
payment increase.  The percentages were even worse 
for respondents who were young adults age eighteen to 
twenty-four (forty-six percent), Hispanics and blacks 
(forty-three percent), people with incomes under 
$25,000 (forty-four percent), and people without a 
high school degree (fifty percent).  Press Release, 
Consumer Fed’n of Am., Lower-Income and Minority 
Consumers Most Likely to Prefer and Underestimate 
Risks of Adjustable Mortgages (July 26, 2004), 
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/ 
072604_ARM_Survey_Release.pdf.  See also infra notes 
127 - 128 and accompanying text. 
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monthly payments by consulting “mortgage payment 
calculators on the Web”61--not their TILA disclosures. 
 If initial disclosures, whether variable-rate or 
otherwise, turn out to be inaccurate, TILA sometimes 
requires redisclosure.  If the lender denies the 
original application and the consumer then amends it, 
the amendment is treated as a new application and the 
three-day period starts anew.62  If a variable-rate 
feature is added to the loan, new disclosures are 
necessary, but only immediately before consummation.63  
Finally, if the actual APR at closing varies from the 
APR that was originally disclosed by more than one-
eighth of one percent, usually the creditor must 
disclose the actual APR by the settlement or 
consummation.64  These last two rules place applicants 
who lack lock-in commitments at the mercy of lenders, 
who can change the loan terms and even the loan 
                     
61
 Damon Darlin, Keep Eyes Fixed on Your Variable-Rate 
Mortgage, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at C1. 
62
 Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
Supp. I, § 226.19(a)(1)-4. 
63
 Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
Supp. I, § 226.17(f)-2.  See supra notes 50 - 59 and 
accompanying text for the content of these 
disclosures. 
64
 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2) (2000); 12 C.F.R. §§ 
226.17(f), 226.19(a)(2), 226.22(a); Official Staff 
Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 
226.17(f)-1(i)(A). 
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products behind the scenes and then spring the new 
loan terms on the borrowers at closing.65 
 
b. High-Cost Loans Governed by the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act.  Under the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”),66 federal disclosure 
law imposes stricter disclosure requirements on 
certain high-cost residential mortgages.  HOEPA 
applies to most high-cost, closed-end, refinance 
residential mortgages.  HOEPA defines high-cost loans 
in two ways: (1) loans with APRs of at least eight 
percent over the yield on Treasury securities of 
comparable maturity for first-lien loans (or ten 
percent for subordinate-lien loans); or (2) loans 
with total points and fees exceeding eight percent of 
the total loan amount or $400 (indexed annually), 
whichever is greater.67 
                     
65
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 43; 
Renuart, supra note 3, at 483. 
66
 Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of TILA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1601 – 1667). 
67
 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w), (aa)(1) – (4); 12 C.F.R. § 
226.32(a), (b)(1).  HOEPA does not apply to high-cost 
reverse mortgages.  15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1), (bb); 12 
C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(2).  The federal government has 
civil enforcement powers for violations of HOEPA.  In 
addition, willful and knowing violations of HOEPA are 
subject to criminal prosecution.  15 U.S.C. § 1611; 
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 These so-called “HOEPA loans” require added 
disclosures at least three days before closing.68  The 
advance disclosures include the final APR, the amount 
of individual monthly payments, the amount of any 
balloon payment, the principal borrowed, and fees for 
any credit insurance or debt-cancellation policy.69  
Lenders must notify borrowers in writing that they 
could lose their homes upon default.70  Similarly, 
borrowers must be advised that they do not have to 
accept the loans just because they submitted loan 
applications or received disclosures.71  For variable-
rate HOEPA loans, lenders must also advise borrowers 
that their interest rates and monthly payments could 
increase and provide them with their maximum monthly 
                                                       
see discussion supra note 40.  HOEPA affords 
borrowers the same private right of action available 
under TILA.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a); see supra note 40.  
In addition to TILA’s standard remedies, borrowers 
who recover under HOEPA have a right to special 
enhanced damages consisting of all finance charges 
and fees paid by the borrower, 15 U.S.C. § 
1640(a)(4), plus expanded rights of rescission.  15 
U.S.C. §§ 1635, 1639(j); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3).  
See generally RENUART & KEEST, supra note 18, §§ 9.4.9, 
9.6 (discussing remedies for HOEPA violations). 
68
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602(aa), 1639(a) – (b). 
69
 Id. § 1639(a)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c). 
70
 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1)(B). 
71
 Id. § 1639(a)(1)(A). 
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payment if the loan becomes fully indexed.72 
 The disclosure requirements for HOEPA loans 
represent marginal improvement over TILA’s woefully 
inadequate disclosures for refinance loans.  However, 
HOEPA does not cover subprime purchase money 
mortgages.73  As a result, and because HOEPA’s 
triggers are set so high for refinance loans, HOEPA 
disclosures apply at most to five percent of subprime 
first-lien home loans.74  In any case, it is doubtful 
that a three-day warning is enough to dissuade a 
cash-strapped borrower who is desperate enough to pay 
the stiff rates on HOEPA loans. 
                     
72
 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(2)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c).  
See generally RENUART & KEEST, supra note 18, § 9 
(discussing high-cost home equity loan protections).  
“The fully indexed rate equals the index rate 
prevailing at origination plus the margin that will 
apply after the expiration of an introductory 
interest rate.”  Interagency Guidance on 
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks: Final 
Guidance, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,614 n.5 (Dep’t of 
the Treas. et al. Oct. 4, 2006).  Lenders must also 
advise HOEPA borrowers in advance of the loan closing 
that the total amount borrowed may be substantially 
higher than the amount requested due to the financing 
of insurance, points, and fees.  See Truth in 
Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,610 - 11 (Fed. 
Reserve Sys. Dec. 20, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.32(c)(5)).   
73
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, app. D, at 1. 
74
 See Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,606 - 10. 
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2. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
 RESPA requires lenders who make federally 
related mortgage loans75 to provide borrowers with 
disclosures about their closing costs at two 
different points in the mortgage process.  First, 
within three business days after application, the 
lender or mortgage broker must provide an applicant 
with a good-faith estimate of the settlement costs 
(“GFE”) (Figure 5) and certain other disclosures 
concerning settlement costs and servicing.76  This 
three-day period usually coincides with the three-day 
period for TILA disclosures (which only applies to 
purchase money mortgages).77  Because the GFE only 
contains limited pricing terms--those related to 
origination fees--and does not list, for example, the 
APR, the payment schedule, or the prepayment penalty, 
it does not remedy the lack of mandatory three-day 
TILA disclosures for most home refinance loans.78   
 Later, at the closing for all federally related 
                     
75
 For the meaning of this term, see supra note 42. 
76
 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603 - 2605(a) (2000); 24 C.F.R. §§ 
3500.6(a)(1), 3500.7, 3500.21(b) (2005); id. pt. 3500 
app. C. 
77
 See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 18, at 172 n.244. 
78
 See supra notes 44 - 46 and accompanying text. 
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mortgage loans (including refinance loans and reverse 
mortgages), the settlement agent must furnish the 
borrower with a standardized form listing the actual 
settlement costs paid at closing, known as a HUD-1 
settlement statement (Figure 6), plus an initial 
escrow statement.79  Borrowers have the right to 
inspect the HUD-1 upon request the day before 
closing.80  Like the GFE, the HUD-1 will only disclose 
origination costs, not the APR or certain other key 
disclosures mandated by TILA.  Accordingly, lenders 
who extend home refinance loans (other than the 
limited set of HOEPA loans) do not have to disclose 
the APR until the closing. 
 Under RESPA, injured borrowers have little 
recourse for false disclosures except to petition HUD 
for government enforcement.81  Specifically, borrowers 
cannot recover damages unless they can prove that 
lenders:  (1) failed to inform them that their loans 
could be transferred;82 (2) received illegal kickbacks 
                     
79
 24 C.F.R. § 3500.8; id. pt. 3500 app. A.  The 
lender may also need to make servicing disclosures at 
closing.  Id. § 3500.21(c); id. pt. 3500 app. MS-1. 
80
 24 C.F.R. § 3500.10(a). 
81
 Agency enforcement authority for RESPA is vested in 
HUD.  12 U.S.C. §§ 2602(6), 2617(a). 
82
 Id. § 2605(f) (authorizing actual damages, 
statutory damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees). 
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as defined by RESPA;83 or (3) steered them to title 
companies.84  Lenders have no liability to borrowers 
under RESPA for errors in GFEs or HUD-1 settlement 
statements, thereby dampening their motives to ensure 
accuracy.85  
 RESPA’s timing rules have the same faults as 
TILA’s timing rules.  Lenders do not have to provide 
GFEs until after consumers have paid a nonrefundable 
application fee and, while borrowers can request a 
HUD-1 the day before closing, nothing requires 
lenders to notify borrowers of that right and 
borrowers are generally ignorant of it.86  
Furthermore, GFEs may have scant resemblance to 
actual closing costs because lenders are allowed to 
provide meaningless estimated ranges and do not face 
suit for inaccurate GFEs.87  This problem is of 
                     
83
 Id. § 2607 (authorizing treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees). 
84
 Id. § 2608.  The defendant is liable for up to 
three times the fee for the title insurance.  Id. § 
2608(b). 
85
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at XIX, 21. 
86
 See id. at 43. 
87
 See id. at XI.  In a survey of GFEs, one author 
concluded that numerous GFEs were off by “a fair 
amount” and that some borrowers received “large 
underestimates.”  Mark Shroder, The Value of the 
Sunshine Cure: Efficacy of the RESPA Disclosure 
Strategy 12 (HUD Working Paper, 2000) (on file with 
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particular concern in the subprime market, where 
settlement costs range from high to plainly 
exorbitant.88  As a result, GFEs are not helpful to 
consumers for comparison-shopping.   
In sum, federal disclosure laws are problematic 
for subprime mortgage customers in four key respects.  
First, federal law does not require accurate 
disclosures of the cost of subprime loans before a 
customer pays a nonrefundable application fee (except 
for certain variable-rate disclosures).  Indeed, 
under TILA, subprime lenders may advertise their best 
rates, even if those rates only apply to sterling 
customers.  Second, TILA’s variable-rate disclosures 
are too complex and obscure the information that is 
most critical to consumers--their worst case payment 
scenario.  Third, for most closed-end home refinance 
loans other than HOEPA loans, lenders can legally 
postpone making TILA disclosures on the APR and other 
key price terms until the closing.  Lastly, binding 
cost disclosures are usually not required until 
closing (except for borrowers who have HOEPA loans or 
                                                       
the author). 
88
 See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1266 - 
67 & n.30; Renuart, supra note 3, at 467, 475 - 76, 
482; Shroder, supra note 87, at 14 - 15, tbl.4.  
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request their HUD-1s the day before closing), which 
means that lenders can change the loan terms at the 
eleventh hour with no advance notice to borrowers.   
III. CONSUMER SEARCH AND PRICE REVELATION:  THE EFFECT OF MARKET 
FORCES 
 As the previous discussion suggests, federal 
disclosure laws do not ensure that consumers get 
accurate information sufficiently early in the 
mortgage process to permit low-cost, meaningful 
comparison-shopping.  To the extent that consumers do 
get timely, accurate information, it is due to market 
forces, not federal disclosure law.   
A. Search in the Prime Market 
 In the prime market, pricing is highly 
competitive, lenders market mortgages as commodities, 
and the market results in roughly homogeneous prices.  
Prime customers know that identical mortgages89 go for 
                     
89
 Of course, mortgages with identical terms (such as 
a 30-year fixed mortgage or a 2/28 hybrid adjustable-
rate mortgage) may carry different interest rates 
depending on the number of points.  Each of those 
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about the same price and that lenders with 
competitive rates will prominently advertise 
discounts.  Consequently, consumers will gravitate 
toward lenders who post prices.  Prime lenders know 
this, which gives them strong incentives to advertise 
accurate prices in order to attract customers.  
Today, it is easy to comparison-shop for prime 
mortgages on the Internet, where standardized price 
information abounds (Figure 7). 
 These market forces mean that consumers who shop 
in the prime market do not have to pay application 
fees in order to get price quotes.  Lenders reveal 
prices for free.  Furthermore, because prices are 
highly competitive and mortgages are commodities, 
lenders have to offer consumers an added bonus to get 
them to apply.  This gives consumers leverage to 
negotiate lock-in commitments and insist on “buy 
downs” on prices, in the form of interest rate 
reductions in exchange for points or other fees 
(Figure 7).90 
 When TILA was enacted in 1968,91 the prime market 
                                                       
pricing structures is a separate product and should 
be advertised as such. 
90
 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
91
 Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) 
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was the only conventional mortgage market.  That was 
the market that TILA was designed for.  There, market 
forces ensure that lenders reveal critical price 
terms--including interest rates, lock-in commitments, 
and points--upfront and for free.  In tandem with 
those forces, TILA was designed to standardize 
voluntary price disclosures.  TILA does this 
relatively effectively for consumers who are prime-
eligible and shopping for prime loans. 
 To be sure, price revelation could stand 
improvement in the prime market.  Problems with 
RESPA’s timing rules and lack of private enforcement 
for GFEs make closing costs a continued problem.  
Hidden transaction costs can be substantial in 
residential loan transactions and can haunt customers 
at closing, whether they are in the prime or subprime 
market.92  Furthermore, guaranteed closing cost 
packages are still uncommon even in the prime market, 
although some lenders do offer them (at least for 
settlement costs within the lender’s control).93  The 
                                                       
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 – 1693 
(2000)). 
92
 See, e.g., Kenneth Harney, Guaranteed Closing Costs 
Are Approaching, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 9, 2005, at 2F. 
93
 See, e.g., Amerisave, Guaranteed Closing Costs in 
Writing, http://www.amerisave.com/why_amerisave/ 
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prime market is sufficiently competitive and prime 
customers are sufficiently savvy that closing cost 
abuses are less of a problem than in the subprime 
market.  Nevertheless, all home mortgage applicants--
prime and subprime--pay too much because of lack of 
transparency in closing costs.  This problem is 
especially severe with respect to yield spread 
premia,94 which are a pernicious form of broker 
                                                       
writingcosts.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006); E-Loan, 
Guaranteed Closing Costs, http://www.eloan.com/s/ 
show/guarantee (last visited Oct. 8, 2006); Harney, 
supra note 92, at 2F. 
94
 A yield spread premium is a reward paid by a lender 
to a mortgage broker for persuading the borrower to 
pay a higher interest rate than the lowest interest 
rate that the lender would be willing to accept.  As 
such, yield spread premia are per se anticompetitive 
and hurt consumer welfare.  See, e.g., DEP’TS OF THE 
TREASURY & HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE 
LENDING 40 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/ 
Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (stating that consumer 
advocates believe yield spread premia encourage 
brokers to increase interest rates); Predatory 
Mortgage Lending Practices: Hearing on Abusive Uses 
of Yield Spread Premia Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 56 
(2002) (statement of Howell E. Jackson, Prof. of Law, 
Harvard Univ.) (concluding that yield spread premia 
“serve only to [benefit] mortgage brokers,” not 
consumers, and levy “implicit interest rates [that] 
are absolutely outrageous”), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/02_01hrg/010802/ 
jackson.htm.  See generally Howell E. Jackson & 
Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of 
Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2002) (unpublished 
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compensation, but it pervades closing costs across 
the board. 
B. Search in the Subprime Market 
Consumer search is entirely different in the 
subprime world, where market forces impede meaningful 
comparison-shopping.  In the subprime market, the 
market conditions on which TILA was based--lock-in 
commitments and free and early price revelation--
break down.  Instead, subprime lenders do not reveal 
prices until consumers pay to play. 
In risk-based pricing, a lender cannot determine 
the actual price for a loan until the customer 
reveals information about his or her 
creditworthiness.95  Today, lenders use the loan 
application process for that purpose, even though 
there are other, cheaper ways to research a 
customer’s creditworthiness.  As a result, the 
subprime market requires a customer to apply for a 
loan, pay a nonrefundable application fee, and go 
                                                       
manuscript), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
hjackson/pdfs/january_draft.pdf (arguing that yield 
spread premia exploit less sophisticated borrowers).   
95
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 40. 
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through underwriting to learn the price.  Even then, 
subprime lenders often do not reveal the true price 
until closing.   
1. Lack of Firm Price Quotes Before Application 
In the prime market, consumers are able to 
obtain firm price quotes without charge on interest 
rates, APR, and points, by consulting advertisements 
or price lists posted by lenders.  In the subprime 
market, this is virtually impossible because pricing 
mechanisms are hidden and advertisements usually tout 
only the lender’s best price. 
In the subprime market, lenders use their own 
internal price lists (known as “rate sheets”) to 
determine what price to charge a given borrower for a 
specific loan.96  A subprime rate sheet is a grid 
containing different prices for a specific loan. 
(Figure 8).  This information would be useful to 
consumers in shopping for loans.  Consumers cannot 
get this information, however, because subprime 
lenders protect rate sheets as proprietary secrets 
and only share them with their employees and mortgage 
                     
96
 See White, supra note 15, at 509 – 12. 
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brokers (Figure 9, asterisk footnote).97  Nothing in 
federal disclosure law prohibits withholding the 
information on rate sheets from consumers.   
Consequently, to comparison-shop before the 
application stage in the subprime market, consumers 
must rely on general advertisements or oral 
representations by mortgage brokers or loan officers. 
Even though subprime lenders and brokers keep rate 
sheets secret, that does not hinder them from running 
advertisements with price quotes.  Indeed, it is a 
common practice for them to quote their best price, 
whether or not the loan applicant qualifies for it 
and often without disclaimers.98  In effect, this 
operates as an affirmative misstatement for consumers 
with weaker credit profiles and can induce them to 
apply for loans that turn out to be higher-priced at 
closing.   
Some advertisements and websites that quote low 
rates cater specifically to subprime borrowers.  
                     
97
 See id. (providing examples of subprime rate 
sheets). 
98
 See, e.g., Michael Hudson, Popular Mortgage Web 
Site Under Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2006, at D1 
(describing a lawsuit against Bankrate.com for 
allegedly “allowing its website to become a haven for 
‘bait-and-switch’ loan practices”). 
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Figure 10, for instance, illustrates an Internet site 
that allowed consumers to shop for mortgages based on 
their personal credit score.  Here, a search on July 
4, 2006, for a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage for a 
borrower with a weak credit score of 59099 resulted in 
quotes ranging from 6.1% with 1.5 points to 6.5% with 
two points.  That week, average rates on thirty-year 
fixed-rate mortgages were 6.78% with 0.5 points, 
meaning that the rates quoted on the website appeared 
to be prime rates.100  Only if readers clicked on the 
                     
99
 Generally, Fair Isaac Company (“FICO”) scores below 
660 are considered to be poorer quality, subprime 
credit scores.  White, supra note 15, at 509 n.2.  
See generally ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER 
FED’N OF AM., EXOTIC OR TOXIC?  AN EXAMINATION OF THE NON-
TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS AND LENDERS 25 - 26 
(2006), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage
_Report0506.pdf (discussing the distribution of 
borrower FICO scores for newly prevalent loan 
products). 
100
 Freddie Mac, Weekly Primary Mortgage Market Survey 
(June 29, 2006), http://www.freddiemac.com/dlink/ 
html/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp (last visited Oct. 
8, 2006). 
In general, subprime interest rates are at least 
200 basis points--two percentage points--above prime 
rates for comparable products.  See White, supra note 
15, at 512 - 13.  In contrast, assuming that the 
borrower takes out a $200,000 loan, the APR on the 
6.1% loan with 1.5 points is 6.24% and on the 6.5% 
loan with 2 points is 6.691%, while the APR on the 
6.78% loan with 0.5 points is 6.829% (assuming no 
other closing costs for the loan).  This means that 
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link “More info” and scrolled down a long page would 
they find a disclaimer stating:  “Rate/APR and terms 
may vary based on the creditworthiness of the 
individual . . . .”101  Given this disclaimer, it is 
not clear why the website allowed consumers to type 
in low credit scores at all unless the website was 
designed to give the misleading impression that a 
borrower with a 590 credit score would in fact 
receive the quoted prime rates. 
In sum, subprime borrowers who do not qualify 
for a lender’s best rates do not have the ability to 
obtain firm quotes before they apply for loans.  
Making matters worse, consumers with weak credit are 
likely to be misled by advertising featuring low 
subprime rates unless they actually qualify for those 
rates. 
2. Lack of Firm Price Quotes After Application 
                                                       
the rates quoted on the website were probably better 
than prime rates. 
101
 In the search, the link “more info” appeared at 
http://www.myfico.com/LoanCenter/Results.aspx?Fire=11
&States=22&Markets=257&LoanTypes=4&LowerLimit=&UpperL
imit=&Score=590 (last visited July 4, 2006).  
Clicking on the link led to the disclaimer.  
Subsequently, this website took down these pages and 
changed its search methodology. 
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With the exception of HOEPA loans, TILA and 
RESPA normally do not require firm price disclosures 
until the closing.102  Neither statute regulates the 
price terms that a loan officer or broker may enter 
on the application form.  Similarly, neither statute 
requires firm price terms to be disclosed within 
three business days after receipt of an application.  
Instead, if the disclosures on GFEs or preliminary 
TILA disclosures prove inaccurate, the only cure is 
accurate disclosure at the closing.  By then, 
however, disclosure is too late.  By the closing, the 
average customer is psychologically invested in the 
loan and has too much riding on it--such as 
purchasing a house or refinancing unmanageable debts-
-to walk away.103   
Subprime lenders can take advantage of legally 
sanctioned late disclosures to turn the terms and 
prices of subprime loans into a moving target and 
thereby achieve monopolistic pricing.  A lender or 
                     
102
 See supra notes 37 - 49, 62 - 65, 75 - 88 and 
accompanying text. 
103
 See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory 
Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 351 – 52 (2005) 
(stating that on the day of the loan closing “a 
borrower has psychologically committed herself to the 
loan”). 
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broker might direct a customer to apply for one type 
of loan at Price A--say, a fixed-rate loan--change 
the loan during underwriting to an adjustable-rate 
mortgage at Price B, and change the loan again at 
closing to something different, such as an interest-
only adjustable-rate mortgage, at Price C.  Not 
surprisingly, the final price is often higher than 
the original quoted price.   
The moving target problem is even worse for 
refinance loans that are not governed by HOEPA.  In 
these cases, lenders do not even need to provide 
three-day TILA disclosures and can wait until closing 
to make their first loan-specific disclosures about 
the loan’s APR.104  The case of Lucy Brown is 
instructive.105  In 1998, Ms. Brown applied for a 
thirty-year fixed-rate refinance loan at a nominal 
interest rate of 10.75%.  Her preliminary TILA 
disclosure stated an 11.013% APR and a finance charge 
of $189,903.90.  The disclosure said that her loan 
had no variable rate feature or prepayment penalty.  
During underwriting, the lender rated Ms. Brown as an 
                     
104
 See supra notes 44 - 46 and accompanying text. 
105
 This information was reviewed confidentially by 
the author.  The facts are real but the name has been 
changed to protect the identity of the borrower.   
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“A” grade borrower who presumably qualified for a 
prime-rate loan.   
Nevertheless, with no advance notice, the lender 
presented Ms. Brown at closing with a high-fee 
variable-rate loan carrying a large prepayment 
penalty and an initial nominal interest rate of 
11.25%.  The final TILA disclosure, first presented 
to her at closing, revealed that her APR had risen 
27.64% to 14.085% and her finance charge had jumped 
38.56% to $263,133.60.  If Ms. Brown had received a 
prime loan, it would have cost her far less:  at the 
time, the average prime-rate fixed thirty-year home 
mortgage carried a nominal interest rate of 7.00% and 
one point.  The mortgage broker’s file on Ms. Brown 
contained four different loan applications, each for 
a fixed-rate loan on different terms.  She only 
signed two of the applications and none was for the 
variable-rate loan she ultimately got.   
Sometimes lenders have legitimate reasons to 
change the loan terms during underwriting.  For 
instance, the lender may decide that the applicant 
could not qualify for the loan requested, either on 
the face of the application or because the 
application was incomplete and subsequent facts 
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revealed underwriting problems.  Even legitimate 
reasons to change the loan terms, however, do not 
justify allowing lenders to wait until the closing to 
reveal the change in terms, as TILA and RESPA usually 
permit. 
Other times, lenders and brokers have 
underhanded motives for switching the loan terms and 
springing them on the borrower at closing.  For 
instance, behind the scenes, brokers may negotiate a 
yield spread premium in exchange for higher interest 
payments to the lender.106  In Ms. Brown’s case, the 
lender paid the broker a $2373 yield spread premium 
as a reward for increasing the interest rate on the 
loan from 10.75% to 11.25% and for changing the loan 
from a fixed-rate loan to a riskier adjustable-rate 
loan with a large prepayment penalty.  Before the 
closing, the broker did not tell Ms. Brown that it 
would receive a large yield spread premium in 
exchange for driving up the cost of her loan.  In Ms. 
Brown’s case, the result was bait-and-switch. 
 Of course, if customers could negotiate lock-in 
commitments with subprime lenders, they could largely 
avoid the moving target problem.  Subprime customers 
                     
106
 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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with weak credit, however, have reduced leverage to 
insist on those commitments because lenders know 
these customers have fewer options and cannot qualify 
for prime credit.  Subprime customers, moreover, tend 
to be less well-educated and less sophisticated about 
the mortgage market.107  Subprime lenders, knowing 
that that they can usually delay firm price quotes 
until closing under TILA and RESPA, have no legal 
compunction to offer lock-in commitments.  This 
leaves subprime borrowers vulnerable to nasty 
surprises at closing. 
3. Problems with Variable-Rate Disclosures 
 Variable-rate loans are now the dominant first-
lien loan product in the subprime market.108  
Recently, two new types of adjustable-rate mortgages 
(“ARMs”) have cropped up in the subprime market:  
interest-only (“I-O”) ARMs and option ARMs.  These 
                     
107
 See Lax et al., supra note 14, at 544 - 56. 
108
 See, e.g., id. at 543; Roberto G. Quercia et al., 
The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime 
Foreclosures:  The Special Case of Prepayment 
Penalties and Balloon Payments 23, 29 - 30 (Center 
for Community Capitalism Working Paper, 2005), 
available at http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/ 
assets/documents/foreclosurepaper.pdf.  
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mortgages present substantially greater risks of 
payment shock than traditional ARMs.  This heightened 
risk, especially to subprime borrowers, underscores 
the urgency of reforming variable-rate TILA 
disclosures. 
 In I-O mortgages, borrowers only pay interest 
for an initial period lasting anywhere from six 
months to five years.  Once the introductory period 
expires, the borrowers’ payments go up, often 
substantially, for up to four distinct reasons.  
First, the loan begins to amortize and borrowers 
start paying principal as well as interest.  Second, 
the principal payments are higher than they would be 
under a fully amortizing loan because there are fewer 
years left to pay off the principal.  Thus, in a 
thirty-year I-O ARM with a three-year introductory 
period, the principal will normally be paid off in 
twenty-seven years, not thirty.  Third, if interest 
rates are rising, the variable-rate on the loan will 
go up on the reset date.  Finally, numerous I-O ARMs 
offer introductory teaser rates that are below the 
indexed rate.  Accordingly, when the teaser rate 
expires and the rate resets, the interest rate could 
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jump higher than it would from an indexed rate.109    
 Option ARMs are cousins of I-O ARMs and 
potentially even riskier.  During the introductory 
period for an option ARM, a borrower can choose among 
four payment options:  accelerated amortization of 
principal (over fifteen years), normal amortization 
(over thirty years), interest-only payments, or a low 
minimum payment that does not even pay off the 
interest due that month.110  If a borrower opts for 
the minimum payment--as do up to seventy percent of 
option ARM borrowers111--the unpaid interest will be 
                     
109
 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. CAGAN, FIRST AM. REAL ESTATE 
SOLUTIONS, MORTGAGE PAYMENT RESET:  THE RUMOR AND THE REALITY 
17, 25 (2006), available at 
http://www.firstamres.com/pdf/MPR_White_Paper_FINAL.p
df (discussing the burden of higher payments when 
teaser rates reset); MICHAEL FRATANTONI ET AL., MORTGAGE 
BANKERS ASS’N, HOUSING AND MORTGAGE MARKETS:  AN ANALYSIS 55 
(2005), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/ 
files/Bulletin/InternalResource/38151_MBA_Monograph_N
o1.pdf (describing I-O loan repayment); Jody Shenn, 
ARM Lenders Prep for Wave Of Teaser-Rate Expirations, 
AM. BANKER, Jan. 18, 2006, at 1, 11 (discussing the 
anticipated consequences of the first significant 
wave of ARM payment shock); Ruth Simon, Home Rundown:  
A Look at the Pros and Cons of Different Types of 
Mortgages--and Which One May Be the Best for You Now, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2006, at R4 (informing readers 
about the drawbacks of I-O loans). 
110
 See FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 99, at 7; FRATANTONI 
ET AL., supra note 109, at 56. 
111
 See FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 99, at 7. 
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added to principal, causing the loan balance to 
grow.112  This negative amortization makes the initial 
monthly payments enticing.  Once the introductory 
period expires, however, the borrower must start 
making regular principal and interest payments for 
the remainder of the loan.  Option ARMs present the 
same risks of payment shock as I-O ARMs, plus the 
risk that the principal may grow over time due to 
negative amortization, further increasing the 
eventual payments.  Even before the introductory 
period expires, payments can also go up if negative 
amortization boosts the balance on the loan above a 
specified level, generally 110% to 125% of the 
original loan amount.113  For all of these reasons, 
option ARMs “are the most likely” of all 
nontraditional mortgages “to default.”114 
 Both types of loans have made inroads into the 
subprime market.  By the third quarter of 2005, over 
one-quarter of new subprime loans were I-O loans.115  
                     
112
 See FRATANTONI ET AL., supra note 109, at 56. 
113
 When this happens, the loan “recasts.”  See Cagan, 
supra note 109, at 17; Simon, supra note 109, at R4. 
114
 Cagan, supra note 109, at 29. 
115
 Doug Duncan, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, MBA Nonprime 
Conference 18 (May 22, 2006), http://www.mbaa.org/ 
files/Conferences/2006/Non-Prime/ 
MarketOutlook.ppt#397 (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).  
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Similarly, a recent study found that option ARM 
borrowers had “lower credit scores than borrowers 
overall” and often had subprime credit scores 
(usually defined as FICO scores below 660).116  The 
same study found that African American and Latino 
borrowers were more likely to receive I-O and option 
ARMs than non-minority borrowers even after 
controlling for income, debt loads and credit 
scores.117   
 There are substantial reasons for concern about 
the payment shock associated with I-O and option 
ARMs, particularly for cash-strapped subprime 
borrowers.  One industry commentator warned that when 
interest rates reset from teaser rates, monthly 
payments could double on both types of loans, placing 
the affected borrowers in financial jeopardy: 
It is important to note that a household 
facing a doubling of mortgage payments will 
be in difficulty, whether that increase is 
applied in a single month or in a series of 
                                                       
In the first quarter of 2006, originations of I-O 
loans dropped thirty percent from the previous 
quarter but still remained substantial.  Standard & 
Poor’s, Sector Report Card:  The Heat Is On For 
Subprime Mortgages 3 (July 10, 2006) (S&P Ratings 
Direct). 
116
 See FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 99, at 25 – 26; see 
also White, supra note 15, at 509 n.2. 
117
 See FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 99, at 22, 24. 
McCoy (JOL)  12/20/06 8:15 PM Page 56 
 
 
incremental steps spread over two years 
. . . .  [A] loan with an initial [teaser] 
rate of 1 percent that resets to a market 
rate of 6.3 percent will experience a 
substantial increase in payments, all the 
more so if negative amortization has 
increased the total principal amount 
subject to interest.  That type of loan 
will experience reset payment sensitivity.  
An option-payment loan with a minimum 
payment below that of a 1 percent loan will 
face even greater reset sensitivity. 118 
These dynamics can and do lead to increased subprime 
default rates.  A recent Fannie Mae analysis of 
subprime ARMs that underwent rate reset and were 
originated between March 2003 and March 2004 found, 
for instance, that sixteen percent of the borrowers 
                     
118
 Cagan, supra note 109, at 19 (emphasis in 
original); see also id. at 21, 25 (noting that when 
“[teaser-rate] loans finally adjust to fully-
amortizing market-rate levels, the payments will have 
increased by more than fifty percent from their 
initial amounts.  Often the payments will have 
doubled, or more than doubled.”); Simon, supra note 
109, at R8 (“If rates go up by two percentage points, 
monthly payments could nearly double.”).  While Cagan 
discounted the presence of teaser rates and thus of 
the severity of reset adjustments for subprime loans, 
Cagan, supra note 109, at 21, FitchRatings reported 
in 2006 that the “current environment” was of “deeply 
teased short-term subprime hybrid ARMs combined with 
an interest-only affordability feature.”  
FitchRatings, Rating Subprime RMBS Backed By 
Interest-Only ARMs 1 (March 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.fitchratings.com.; see also Interagency 
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks: 
Final Guidance, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,613 - 14 
(Dep’t of the Treas. et al. Oct. 4, 2006). 
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had defaulted or were late making payments by mid 
2006.119 
 The prevalence of I-O and option ARMs in the 
subprime market suggests that these loans are often 
underwritten for the wrong reason.  Due to the 
potential for large payment shock, these products are 
best suited for borrowers who have large disposable 
incomes, receive bonuses, or expect their income to 
rise sharply during the introductory period.120  None 
of these conditions normally holds for subprime 
borrowers.  Rather, subprime borrowers usually take 
out these loans to minimize their monthly payments on 
large loan balances.  Sometimes they do so to buy a 
                     
119
 See Vikas Bajaj & Ron Nixon, Variable Loans Help 
to Put Off Mortgage Pain, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at 
A21.   Fitch Ratings estimates that thirty percent of 
all subprime loans will undergo rate reset in 2006 
and another twenty-two percent in 2007, many of which 
are I-O ARMs.  FitchRatings, supra note 118, at 13. 
120
 See Cagan, supra note 109, at 17  (commenting that 
“[t]hese loans . . . may be useful to homeowners who 
anticipate substantial increases in their income 
(such as recent graduates from law school), and to 
those who have low incomes for most of the year but 
receive high lump sum payments from time to time 
(such as people who are self-employed or 
professionals who receive much of their income in the 
form of a yearly bonus)”); FRATANTONI ET AL., supra note 
109, at 55 – 56 (describing the types of borrowers I-
O loans were designed for); Simon, supra note 109, at 
R4. 
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larger house or refinance large debts.  Other times, 
they do so to buy a starter home in regions where 
payments on a fixed-rate loan on a starter home would 
exceed their means.121  This is particularly common in 
overheated coastal real estate markets such as 
California.122  Many lenders approve these loans to 
subprime borrowers based solely on a household’s 
ability to pay the initial monthly payments, not on 
the possible maximum payments.123  As Fitch, a leading 
                     
121
 See Cagan, supra note 109, at 14, 17 (observing 
that “many adjustable-rate mortgage borrowers . . . 
bought recently and stretched their financial 
abilities to acquire a home with a low down payment 
and a low monthly payment”); see also FRATANTONI ET AL., 
supra note 109, at 56, 58 (stating that some 
borrowers use I-O loans to “extend their purchase 
power as house prices have increased”); Ruth Simon, 
Option ARMs Remain Popular In Spite of Risks, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 15, 2006, at A2 (stating that “borrowers 
seeking to lower their monthly payments have few 
other choices” than option ARMs). 
122
 See FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 99, at 4; FRATANTONI 
ET AL., supra note 109, at 50. 
123
 See Shenn, supra note 109 (reporting that lending 
“standards loosened throughout 2004 and 2005, 
particularly through the increased use of ‘stated’ 
incomes, higher debt-to-income ratios, and low down 
payments”).  In 2006, federal banking regulators 
issued an interagency guidance that requires 
federally insured depository institutions who make I-
O and option ARM loans to “address the effect of a 
substantial payment increase on the borrower’s 
capacity to repay when loan amortization begins.”  
Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage 
Product Risks: Final Guidance, 71 Fed. Reg. at 
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credit rating agency, has warned, however, when 
lenders qualify financially strapped borrowers for 
loans only “at the initial rate and IO payments,” not 
the larger eventual payments, “payment shock is 
exacerbated.”124  When the loans reset and the 
payments go up, many of these borrowers will find 
that they can no longer afford the payments.125  At 
that point, borrowers will either have to refinance 
(which likely will be difficult), sell their homes, 
or go into default.  Fitch predicts that as “home 
prices stabilize and interest rates rise, . . . 
subprime IO delinquency rates [will] increase.”126 
 Consequently, it is essential that all 
                                                       
58,613.  The regulators issued the proposed guidance 
out of concern that these products “are now offered 
by more lenders to a wider spectrum of borrowers who 
may not otherwise qualify for more traditional 
mortgage loans and may not fully understand the 
associated risks.”  Id. 
124
 FitchRatings, supra note 118, at 11. 
125
 See id. at 10 - 11. 
126
 Id. at 13; see also Interagency Guidance on 
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks: Final 
Guidance, 71 Fed. Reg. at 58,609, 58,616 (expressing 
concern that “interest-only mortgages can carry a 
significant risk of payment shock and negative 
amortization that may not be fully understood by 
consumers”); Simon, supra note 121, at A2 (describing 
a 2006 Credit Suisse Group report finding that 
“[o]ption ARMs are going into foreclosure an average 
of 10 months after the loan is made, earlier than for 
other types of loans”). 
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borrowers, including subprime borrowers, understand 
the worst case payment scenario before they take out 
I-O and option ARMs.  Current TILA disclosures--based 
on an unrealistic, hypothetical $10,000 loan--are 
impossible for most consumers to comprehend.  Even a 
sophisticated borrower would need to locate the 
hypotheticals in the sea of variable-rate disclosures 
and take the time to do the math.  Thus, it comes as 
no surprise that residential borrowers with 
adjustable-rate mortgages “appear to underestimate 
the amount . . . their interest rates can change.”127  
“Borrowers with less income or education seem 
especially likely not to know their mortgage terms,” 
making them “more vulnerable to an increase in 
interest rates.”128 
IV. WHAT TO DO? 
 For all of these reasons, federal mortgage 
disclosures break down in a world of risk-based 
                     
127
 Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know 
Their House Values and Mortgage Terms? 2 (Fed. 
Reserve Bd. Working Paper, 2006), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200603/2
00603pap.pdf; see also supra note 60. 
128
 Bucks & Pence, supra note 127, at 26. 
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pricing.  TILA and RESPA do not mandate reliable 
information for meaningful comparison-shopping in the 
subprime market before application and the subprime 
market does not provide it.  In fact, TILA 
unwittingly countenances affirmative 
misrepresentations to subprime customers by 
permitting lenders to tout their best rates and 
nothing else.  Similarly, in most cases, nothing in 
TILA or RESPA requires lenders to provide firm price 
disclosures until the date of closing.  These 
problems are compounded for variable-rate loans 
because current variable-rate disclosures obscure 
what is most important to subprime borrowers--the 
worst payment case scenario.  While revamped 
disclosures are not a panacea for price revelation 
problems in the subprime market, they are an 
important part of the solution.   
A. Counteracting False Subprime Advertising 
 Currently, virtually all subprime ads that 
publicize rates only quote the best rates (and, for 
variable-rate loans, often these are teaser rates).129  
                     
129
 Assuming, that is, that the advertisement is 
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For everyone except customers who actually qualify 
for the advertised rates, these ads are patently 
misleading.  If comparison-shopping is to be 
meaningful, it is critical to eliminate false 
advertising that is designed to lead consumers down 
the primrose path to higher, hidden prices.  
Concomitantly, improved oversight could help make 
subprime advertising a vehicle for accurate price 
revelation. 
Achieving truth in subprime advertising requires 
four distinct measures.  First, any lender who 
advertises an APR for a subprime product should be 
required to advertise the full range of APRs that it 
charges for that product.  Immediately next to this 
price range, a warning needs to appear stating that 
customers with weak credit will not qualify for the 
best price.   Second, both of these disclosures need 
to be prominent, in boldface, and in a large font.130  
                                                       
truthful.  Some subprime advertisements list low 
rates that the lender does not in fact offer.  See, 
e.g., Letter from Donald S. Clark, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
to Jennifer L. Johnson, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. 2 – 4 (Sept. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/09/docketop-
1253commentfedreservehomeeqlendimagev.pdf. 
130
 In December 2003, the Federal Reserve Board 
laudably proposed rules to standardize the meaning of 
the “clear and conspicuous” standard.  See Truth in 
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Third, for ads marketing adjustable-rate mortgages, 
the text should conspicuously state the maximum APR 
cap for the highest-priced version of the loan to 
inform consumers of the worst case payment scenario.  
Finally, Congress should amend TILA and RESPA to 
provide a private right of action to borrowers who 
enter into detrimental loans in reliance on 
misleading subprime advertisements.  The first three 
measures fall well within the regulatory authority of 
                                                       
Lending, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,793 (Fed. Reserve Sys. 
proposed Dec. 10, 2003).  In June 2004, under intense 
fire from lenders, the Board withdrew the proposed 
rule.  Equal Credit Opportunity, Electronic Fund 
Transfers, Consumer Leasing, Truth in Lending, Truth 
in Savings, 69 Fed. Reg. 35,541 (Fed. Reserve Sys. 
June 25, 2004).  The following year, in the 
bankruptcy reform law, Congress required the Board, 
in consultation with other federal banking regulators 
and the Federal Trade Commission, to promulgate new 
regulations on the meaning of the “clear and 
conspicuous” standard for open-end credit plans.  For 
example, the disclosure requirements for credit card 
plans should result “in disclosures which are 
reasonably understandable and designed to call 
attention to the nature and significance of the 
information in the notice.”  Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-8, tit. XIII, § 1309, 119 Stat. 23, 213 
(2005) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637 note).  
The Board issued a second advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking on the topic in October 2005.  Truth in 
Lending, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,235 (Fed. Reserve Sys., 
advance notice of proposed rulemaking, Oct. 17, 
2005). 
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the Federal Reserve Board to interpret TILA. 
B. Providing Firm Price Quotes to Subprime Customers 
Before Application 
 In an ideal world, subprime customers could get 
firm quotes for free without paying for a mortgage 
application and could then shop those quotes with 
other lenders.  The wrinkle, of course, is that 
subprime customers have to reveal their 
creditworthiness before lenders can compute a price.  
Today, that is accomplished through the loan 
application process, complete with a large 
nonrefundable application fee.  However, given the 
prevalence of rate sheets, automated credit scores, 
and automated underwriting, there is no reason why 
subprime customers should have to make costly formal 
applications in order to obtain firm price quotes. 
 The costs of subprime mortgages fall into two 
broad categories:  price terms and closing costs.131  
Price terms include interest, points, origination 
fees, broker fees, yield spread premia, and 
                     
131
 See generally HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 
40 - 41. 
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prepayment penalties.  Under risk-based pricing, 
these terms can be computed by consulting a lender’s 
rate sheet and determining where customers fall on 
that rate sheet, depending on their credit scores and 
loan-to-value ratios.  Alternatively, lenders who 
determine prices using more sophisticated automated 
underwriting systems could interview the customer for 
the key underwriting variables, enter those variables 
in the system, and obtain a price quote in seconds.132  
With the customer’s permission, a lender can obtain 
the customer’s credit report and credit scores online 
for no more than ten to fifteen dollars.133  
Similarly, the loan-to-value ratio can be estimated 
using the proposed down payment and the purchase 
price of the home.   
                     
132
 For descriptions of automated underwriting for 
applicants with weak credit, see generally Susan 
Wharton Gates et al., Automated Underwriting in 
Mortgage Lending: Good News for the Underserved?, 13 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 369 (2002); Susan Wharton Gates et 
al., Automated Underwriting: Friend or Foe to Low-Mod 
Households and Neighborhoods? (Freddie Mac Working 
Paper, 2003); and John W. Straka, A Shift in the 
Mortgage Landscape: The 1990s Move to Automated 
Credit Evaluations, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 207 (2000). 
133
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 28 – 29, 
39 – 42; Credit InfoCenter, What Do Credit Bureaus 
Charge for Credit Reports?, 
http://www.creditinfocenter.com/creditreports.reportc
ost.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). 
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 Consequently, it is now feasible for lenders and 
brokers to provide firm, upfront price quotes to 
subprime customers at minimal cost.  Indeed, HUD 
reached that conclusion in 1998, when it proposed 
requiring lenders and brokers to provide firm price 
quotes before application in exchange for giving 
lenders and brokers immunity from RESPA’s anti-
kickback provisions.134  Eight years have elapsed 
                     
134
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 28 - 29, 
39 - 42; Simplifying and Improving the Process of 
Obtaining Mortgages to Reduce Settlement Costs to 
Consumers, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134 (Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev. July 29, 2002) [hereinafter HUD Guaranteed 
Package Rule]. 
The anti-kickback provisions of section 8 of 
RESPA prohibit referral fees, fee splitting, and 
unearned fees in residential mortgage transactions.  
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act § 8, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2607 (2000).  When HUD originally proposed 
guaranteed closing cost packages, it recommended 
immunizing yield spread premia from section 8 as an 
inducement to the lending industry to embrace the 
proposal.  See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 
22, 29 - 30; HUD Guaranteed Package Rule, supra, at 
49160 - 61.  The inducement did not work and, more 
importantly, is economically perverse.  Provisions in 
TILA and RESPA that allow lenders to change most loan 
terms until the last minute promote anticompetitive 
practices by allowing lenders and brokers to 
negotiate yield spread premia in exchange for higher 
rates behind the scenes and then spring costlier 
loans on borrowers at closing.  See Jackson, supra 
note 94, at 3; Jackson & Berry, supra note 94.  
Accordingly, any proposal for a guaranteed closing 
cost package should ban the use of yield spread 
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since then and automated underwriting systems have 
become prevalent in the subprime industry.135  By now, 
there is no doubt that lenders and brokers have the 
technical capability to provide firm, written price 
quotes to subprime customers, if not for free, then 
for the cost of pulling the credit report.  Lenders 
should be required to provide such quotes for all 
loans using risk-based pricing, according to a fee 
schedule regulated by law, instead of demanding large 
nonrefundable application fees in order to reveal 
prices.    
 Critics have argued that lenders cannot provide 
firm price quotes before verifying customer 
representations or entering into lock-in 
commitments.136   While sometimes these are legitimate 
concerns, neither poses an insuperable bar.   Price 
quotes are always contingent on verification in the 
prime market and the same would be true in the 
                                                       
premia in exchange for higher interest rates, points, 
fees or prepayment penalties. 
135
 According to FitchRatings, automated “compliance 
systems have become a critical component of the 
underwriting and quality control process” in the 
subprime residential mortgage industry.  Press 
Release, FitchRatings, Fitch Revises RMBS Guidelines 
for Antipredatory Lending Laws (Feb. 23, 2005), 
available at http://www.fitchratings.com. 
136
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 40 - 41. 
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subprime market.137  In the subprime context, 
moreover, the only information that requires 
verification on numerous rate sheets is the loan-to-
value ratio (calculated from the down payment and the 
property value), because the credit history and score 
are available from a trusted third party online.  In 
any event, the surge of low-documentation and no-
documentation loans in the subprime market belies a 
strict need for many types of verification.  And as 
for the issue of lock-in commitments, HUD proposed a 
satisfactory resolution of that issue in 1998:   
The [price term] guarantee would stand for 
a reasonable time to permit the consumer to 
shop.  And unless the borrower chose to 
formally apply and “lock” the interest 
rate, any subsequent change in interest 
rate and points (but not closing costs) 
would be permitted, so long as any change 
to the consumer’s guaranteed rate was 
solely attributable to, and commensurate 
with, changes in the financial markets.138 
HUD’s language similarly underscores the need for 
lenders to offer lock-in commitments as a standard 
option in the subprime market. 
 As for closing costs, the time has come to 
require legally binding quotes on guaranteed closing 
                     
137
 See id. at 42. 
138
 Id.  In addition to interest rate and points, the 
lock-in commitment should also cover origination fees 
and prepayment penalties. 
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cost packages in advance of payment of a 
nonrefundable application fee.139  This reform is long 
overdue in the prime market, but it takes on special 
urgency in the subprime market, where closing costs 
are substantially higher on average, relative to the 
amount financed, than in the prime market.  
Guaranteed packages would include numerous settlement 
costs associated with subprime mortgages, including 
fees for services provided by creditors and third-
party vendors, plus official filing and recording 
fees.  Examples of these costs include broker 
compensation and fees for appraisals, surveys, credit 
reports, underwriting, recording, legal 
representation, title insurance and title searches.140  
                     
139
 HUD and the Federal Reserve Board advanced a 
similar proposal in 1998.  See id. at 32 - 33.  HUD 
formally proposed a guaranteed closing cost rule in 
2002 but eventually put the proposal on the back 
burner due to industry and consumer group opposition.  
See HUD Guaranteed Package Rule, supra note 134; 
Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 71 Fed. Reg. 22,733, 
22,751 (Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. Apr. 24, 2006). 
140
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 23 - 25.  
Note that some cost items overlap the categories of 
prime terms and closing costs.  The cost of 
homeowners’ insurance and transfer taxes would be 
excluded from guaranteed closing cost packages 
because these items depend on consumer choices 
unrelated to the credit transaction.  See id. at 24.  
For discussion of other operational issues in 
implementing guaranteed closing cost packages, see 
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Guaranteed packages would need to go hand-in-hand 
with firm price quotes to prevent lenders from 
undermining the closing cost quotes by increasing the 
price terms after the fact.141  Lenders would continue 
to have to provide borrowers with HUD-1s at closing 
to permit borrowers to verify that guarantees were 
honored.  Providing customers with guaranteed closing 
cost packages before application would enable them to 
comparison-shop intelligently for closing costs. 
 The Federal Reserve Board and HUD have full 
authority to accomplish firm price quotes through 
notice-and-comment rulemakings.   TILA requires 
disclosures “before the credit is extended,”142 which 
gives the Board ample latitude to require firm price 
term disclosures early in the shopping process.  
Similarly, HUD felt confident enough about its 
authority to mandate a guaranteed closing cost 
package under RESPA that it proposed a rule to that 
effect in 2002.143  Thus, firm price quotes could be 
attained without additional congressional 
authorization. 
                                                       
id. at 25 - 31. 
141
 See id. at 22, 28 - 29. 
142
 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(1) (2000). 
143
 See HUD Guaranteed Package Rule, supra note 134. 
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C. Addressing the Moving Target Problem 
 Requiring firm price quotes and guaranteed 
closing cost packages would go a long way toward 
addressing the moving target problem in the subprime 
market.  It would not entirely eliminate the problem, 
however.  The price quotes just proposed would be 
subject to verification and could be raised if the 
customer’s creditworthiness turned out to be worse 
than originally portrayed.  Similarly, lenders would 
have latitude, absent lock-in commitments, to 
increase price terms to account for interest rate 
movements.  Accordingly, the need for verification 
and financial market movements create openings for 
the moving target problem and the potential for 
surprise price hikes at closing. 
 While the moving target problem cannot be wholly 
eliminated, it can be substantially constrained.  
First, the reasons for any price hike should be 
strictly regulated.  Lenders should only be allowed 
to alter price quotes for three reasons:  (1) good 
faith subsequent discoveries or events resulting in a 
downgrade of a customer’s creditworthiness; 
(2) lower-than-expected appraisals affecting loan-to-
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value ratios; and (3) prevailing interest rate 
movements after application (barring any lock-in 
commitment), and only on the condition that any price 
changes be commensurate.  With respect to (1), 
lenders would be barred from raising prices with 
respect to information (such as prior delinquencies 
or bankruptcies) that was already available from the 
customer’s online credit report on the date of the 
price quote.  Furthermore, no price changes would be 
allowed that result from behind-the-scenes 
compensation negotiations for mortgage brokers, loan 
officers, or other lending personnel. 
 Second, if legitimate reasons did exist for 
price changes, only the nominal interest rate, 
discount points, or origination fees could be 
changed.  The lender could not unilaterally change 
any closing costs (including yield spread premia if 
they were regrettably still permitted)144 that were 
guaranteed in the closing cost package.  Limiting 
price increases to the nominal interest rate, 
discount points, or origination fees would help 
promote transparency in pricing.   
 Lastly, lenders who raise price quotes should be 
                     
144
 See supra note 94. 
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required to deliver to the affected borrowers written 
disclosures announcing any new nominal interest rate, 
points, origination fees, finance charge, and APR.  
These disclosures should be made no later than seven 
days before the closing.145  In cases where the lender 
also changes the loan product (such as from a fixed-
rate loan to an adjustable-rate loan), the new 
variable rate disclosures discussed in the next 
section would be required, where applicable.  
Delivery of such disclosures would be automatic and 
would not require a prior request by the borrower.  
The accuracy of all new disclosures and price terms 
should be legally binding on the lender and should 
entitle the borrower to damages if breached.146  In 
addition, any unilateral change in terms at closing 
by the lender should entitle the borrower to a three-
year right of rescission.147   
 All of these changes except the expanded right 
                     
145
 Tolerances could be used to excuse lenders from 
redisclosure for minor changes in the APR.  
Tolerances of 1/8 of one basis point for regular 
transactions and 1/4 of one basis point for irregular 
transactions would be appropriate.  See supra note 64 
and accompanying text.  Tolerances refer to margins 
“within the TILA’s ‘tolerance’ for error”.  See RENUART 
& KEEST, supra note 18, § 4.6.3.2.1.  
146
 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 44. 
147
 See supra note 40. 
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of rescission under TILA could be jointly 
accomplished by HUD under RESPA and the Federal 
Reserve Board under TILA without additional 
congressional authority.  Indeed, HUD embraced many 
of these changes in its proposed guaranteed closing 
cost package rule in 2002.148 
D. Fixing Variable-Rate Disclosures 
 Currently, variable-rate disclosures under TILA 
must recite most of the individual moving parts that 
drive the worst case payment scenario, such as the 
index, the margin, reset dates, individual reset 
caps, and lifetime maximum and minimum interest caps 
(Figures 3a-3c).  These drivers of the worst case 
payment scenario are also found in the loan note at 
closing.  What most consumers care about, however, is 
not the moving parts, but how high their principal 
and interest payments could go if the loan becomes 
fully indexed (and becomes fully amortizing, in the 
case of I-O and option ARM loans).149  Moreover, 
consumers want the actual worst case dollar figures 
                     
148
 See HUD Guaranteed Package Rule, supra note 134. 
149
 See supra notes 58 - 61, 109 - 114 and 
accompanying text. 
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for their own loans, not extrapolations from a 
$10,000 hypothetical.  Today, automated programs make 
tailored disclosures such as these cheap and easy for 
lenders to provide. 
 Accordingly, variable-rate disclosures should be 
pared down and revised to contain just four things.  
First, these disclosures should make it unmistakably 
clear that the borrower has an adjustable-rate loan.  
Second, the disclosures should state the number of 
months or years until the first reset date and the 
maximum interest rate and monthly principal and 
interest payment on that date for the actual loan in 
question. Third, the disclosures should state the 
earliest date on which the loan could become fully 
indexed and the maximum interest rate and monthly 
payment on that date.  Finally, the disclosures 
should state whether the loan will contain a 
prepayment penalty, and if so, the maximum dollar 
value of that penalty and how long it would last.  
The disclosures would look something like this: 
 
You have asked for information about a variable-
rate loan.  With this loan, your interest rate 
and monthly payments would likely increase over 
time. 
 
• In two years from the closing, your 
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principal and interest payments could rise 
as high as $1,950 per month and your annual 
percentage rate could rise as high as 9.5%. 
 
• In six years from the closing, your 
principal and interest payments could rise 
as high as $2,572 per month and your annual 
percentage rate could rise as high as 
14.00%.  This is the highest your principal 
and interest payments could go under this 
loan. 
 
Warning:  If you pay off most or all of your loan 
within two years of the closing, you will have to 
pay your lender a penalty of as much as $9,000. 
 
 
 Lenders would have to provide these disclosures 
in writing along with the initial firm quotes (or, 
for prime loans, before provision of an application 
form or payment of a nonrefundable fee, whichever is 
earlier).  In cases where the lender later changed 
the price terms or loan product for permissible 
reasons, it would need to make new, written variable-
rate disclosures (where applicable) no less than 
seven days before closing. 
 No congressional authorization would be needed 
to make this change.  The Federal Reserve Board has 
full authority under TILA to implement these 
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changes.150 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, the prime market and subprime markets 
are segmented.  The prime market uses average-cost 
pricing and the subprime market uses risk-based 
pricing.  But there is every reason to think that 
risk-based pricing will eventually pervade the prime 
market and lead to the demise of average-cost 
pricing.  The residential mortgage market has already 
started down this road with the invention of the “A-“ 
customer (with slightly weaker credit than the 
typical prime market borrower) and the “Alt-A” 
customer (who looks strong on paper, but provides 
little or no documentary support of income or 
employment).  Eventually it is likely that we will 
have other shades of “A” borrowers, each of whom 
receives an individualized price.   
Current federal mortgage disclosures have broken 
down in the face of risk-based pricing.  This Article 
advances proposals to repair mortgage disclosures 
and, in the process, to make it truly possible to 
                     
150
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a), (d) (2000). 
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meaningfully comparison-shop for residential 
mortgages in a world of risk-based pricing. 
